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CAN THERE EVER BE A 
THEORY OF UTTERANCE 
INTERPRETATION?
Louise Cummings
Abstract: In this paper, I tackle what appears to be a rather simple question: can 
there ever be a theory of utterance interpretation? It will be contended that a 
theory of utterance interpretation is not beyond the intellectual grasp of present-
day pragmatists so much as it is a construct which lacks sense and is unintelligible. 
Although many of our most successful theories exhibit desiderata such as simplicity, 
completeness and explanatory power, it will be argued that these same desiderata 
are problematic when it is utterance interpretation that is the focus of theoretical 
efforts. The case in support of this claim sets out from a detailed analysis of the 
rational, intentional, holistic character of utterance interpretation and draws on the 
insights of the American philosopher Hilary Putnam. To the extent that a theory of 
utterance interpretation is not a difficult empirical possibility to realize so much as 
it is an endeavour which leads to an unintelligible outcome, we consider where this 
situation leaves pragmatists who have a substantial appetite for theory construction.
Keywords: communicative rationality; Putnam, H.; theoretical desiderata; unintel-
ligibility; utterance interpretation.
1. INTROdUCTION
It is not an exaggeration to say that the attainment of a theory in a 
field or an inquiry is considered to be the zenith of human intellectual 
achievement. So strong is the desire to produce theories that scien-
tists often devote their entire careers to their development and not 
an insignificant amount of time to challenging the theories of others. 
The attainment of a theory is in every sense a validation of the inquiry 
that produced it. Not only is the often large expenditure of technical 
and cognitive resources in scientific investigations justified if a theory 
results from an inquiry, but a theory secures the place of certain ideas 
within the body of human knowledge that is transmitted to subsequent 
The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments of Alessandro Capone on 
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generations. So integral are theories to the scientific enterprise that 
they are heralded as the purpose or raison d’être of scientific investiga-
tion to every student of science. The development of theories is also 
widely lauded by the media and lay people, and acknowledged through 
international academic and scientific awards. This emphasis on theory 
is not without rational basis. It is through theories that we explain and 
predict events in the world including the behaviour of other people. 
Theories help us make sense of a rapidly changing environment that 
can prove to be hostile territory to the theoretically naïve and ignorant. 
To this end, some theories (e.g. quantum theory) are highly mathemat-
ical and formal in nature, while other theories (e.g. theory of mind) 
are informal constructs which are no less valuable in consequence (see 
Cummings 2013, 2014a, 2014b) for discussion of theory of mind). This 
paper will address theories in general, before examining one specific 
theory, and the impulse to theorize in scientific and other disciplines.
With such importance attached to the development of theories 
in science, it may seem strange to suggest that the impulse to theo-
rize about utterance interpretation leads to unfortunate consequences. 
Yet, that is exactly what I intend to propose in this paper. It will be ar-
gued that the same theoretical impulse, which has resulted in so many 
notable successes in science, is deeply problematic when we turn to 
the question of the nature of utterance interpretation. To understand 
how this can be so, the argument of the present paper will unfold as 
follows. In section 2, we consider the features which theories aim to 
embody. These so-called desiderata include simplicity, completeness 
and explanatory power, to name just three. In section 3, the nature of 
utterance interpretation is considered. It will be argued that the inter-
pretative process has a rational, intentional, holistic character. To the 
extent that pragmatists claim to develop theories of this process, these 
theories must succeed in capturing these attributes of interpretation. 
In section 4, it will be contended that a rather unpalatable dilemma 
confronts the theorist of utterance interpretation. Such a theorist can 
retain his theoretical aspirations but only at the expense of reducing 
himself to unintelligibility. Alternatively, he can make meaningful state-
ments about utterance interpretation but must relinquish any claim to 
have a theory of this process. The assumptions, which give rise to this 
dilemma, are examined in section 4. Finally, in section 5, we address 
the question: if a theory of utterance interpretation is unintelligible, 
then what can we meaningfully say about interpretation?
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2. THEORETICAL VIRTUES ANd dESIdERATA
It is not infrequently the case that more than one theory accords with 
the data in a particular domain. How are scientists to pursue theory se-
lection in the face of such underdetermination? Scientists are inclined 
to adopt as their chosen theory the one which exhibits certain theo-
retical virtues. These virtues or desiderata have been variously char-
acterized and include simplicity, explanatory power, unity, elegance 
and completeness, to name but a few. Simplicity refers to the number 
and conciseness of a theory’s basic principles (syntactic simplicity) or 
to the number and kinds of entities postulated by a theory (ontologi-
cal simplicity or parsimony). This theoretical desideratum has been 
captured in a principle known as Occam’s (Ockham’s) razor which 
stipulates that we should not multiply entities beyond necessity. In The 
Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, Isaac Newton (1729) 
casts simplicity as his first rule for reasoning in philosophy: «We are to 
admit no more causes of natural things, than such as are both true and 
sufficient to explain their appearances. To this purpose the philoso-
phers say, that Nature does nothing in vain, and more is in vain, when 
less will serve; for Nature is pleased with simplicity, and affects not the 
pomp of superfluous causes». The explanatory power of a theory de-
scribes its capacity to explain observable phenomena. Unsurprisingly, 
scientists are inclined to accept theories which have high explanatory 
power and reject those with low explanatory power. In The Origin of 
Species, Charles Darwin makes direct appeal to explanatory power to 
reject the theory of creation and replace it with his theory of natural 
selection. Darwin (1858) states: «This grand fact of the grouping of all 
organic beings under what is called the Natural System, is utterly in-
explicable on the theory of creation» (626: in Modern Library edition, 
1998). He continues:
Many other facts are, as it seems to me, explicable on this theory [of Natu-
ral Selection … O]n the view of each species constantly trying to increase 
in number, with natural selection always ready to adapt the slowly varying 
descendants of each to any unoccupied or ill-occupied place in nature, 
these facts cease to be strange, or might even have been anticipated (626-
627: in Modern Library edition, 1998).
Explanatory power and simplicity are important in the present 
context because of the contribution they make to a further theoretical 
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virtue or desideratum. That desideratum is the empirical completeness 
of a theory. Scientists are inclined to accept complete theories over 
incomplete theories because the former provide the fullest possible 
explanation of the facts (explanatory power) using only a minimum 
of theoretical principles (parsimony or simplicity). Carrier (1994) cap-
tures the essence of completeness in the following remarks:
What makes completeness desirable and worthwhile to pursue? The chief 
distinction of complete theories is their high explanatory power. In com-
plete theories the corresponding empirical data can be processed without 
recourse to further, independent observation theories. It is the theory it-
self that is sufficient for analysing the operation of the relevant instru-
ments and for correcting the raw-values they supply. The basic principles 
of complete theories thus do a lot more explanatory work than do the 
assumptions heading incomplete ones. There is more explanatory delivery 
for a given theoretical cost. Accordingly, a complete theory excels in theo-
retical parsimony. In such a theory the number of independent fundamen-
tal assumptions is kept at a minimum. This is what makes completeness an 
appealing feature (227-228).
Scientists do not pursue the completeness of theories at any cost. 
If, for example, the testability of a complete theory is reduced over an 
incomplete theory, then we are best to abandon completeness altogeth-
er. Nevertheless, as a guiding principle, and assuming all other things 
are equal, scientists may be expected to be influenced by completeness 
in their choice or selection of a theory in a particular domain.
However, it is the argument of this paper that not all things are 
equal. Specifically, it will be contended that in certain domains such 
as the natural and physical sciences, completeness represents a noble 
theoretical ideal which should be pursued whenever possible. But in 
a domain such as communicative rationality – that is, after all, what a 
theory of utterance interpretation may be taken to represent – a theo-
retical desideratum like completeness leads to particularly pernicious 
consequences. This is because theory generation in the natural and 
physical sciences presupposes rational concepts. It is through these 
concepts that scientific discourse, amongst which we include scientific 
theories, are meaningful and intelligible. The same cannot be said of 
theory generation in utterance interpretation. The completeness of a 
theory in this domain does not presuppose rational concepts and is 
not meaningful or intelligible in consequence. The issue is not one of 
emphasis but a difference in the type of question that can be intelligi-
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bly addressed by a complete theory. When that question concerns the 
conditions under which human thinking and rationality are possible, 
including human communicative rationality, and is not simply about 
some phenomenon in the natural or physical world, it will be argued 
subsequently that we leave the domain of rational inquiry altogether in 
our pursuit of a complete theory. The same theoretical virtues, which 
lead to rational theory selection for the scientist, are positively destruc-
tive of the intelligibility of any theory of utterance interpretation that 
the pragmatist may produce. We will return to this point in sections 4 
and 5. But in the meantime, we examine the phenomenon of utterance 
interpretation that the pragmatist is eager to attain a complete theory of.
3. THE NATURE OF UTTERANCE INTERPRETATION
Theoretical desiderata like simplicity reveal the type of criteria that a 
theory of utterance interpretation might be expected to fulfil. But aside 
from these criteria, such a theory must also faithfully represent the na-
ture of utterance interpretation. In this section, that nature is examined 
in detail. It will be argued that utterance interpretation has a rational, 
intentional, holistic character. In demonstration of this claim, consider 
the following communicative exchange between Paul and Mike:
Paul: Can we stay with you in Milan again this summer?
Mike: Rose’s mother will be with us this year.
Paul: That’s fine. It will do us no harm to stay somewhere else for a 
change.
This exchange is typical of thousands of similar verbal encoun-
ters that take place on a daily basis. Paul has made a request of Mike 
– he and his spouse (let’s call her «Sally») would like to stay with Mike 
and his wife in Milan in the summer. Mike has implicated by way of his 
utterance that this will not be possible – Rose’s mother will be staying 
in Milan and so Paul and Sally cannot be accommodated. Paul readily 
recovers this implicature of Mike’s utterance. His acknowledgement 
of this implicature takes the form of a statement to the effect that it 
will do him and Sally no harm to stay somewhere else for a change. 
The apparent ease with which Paul and Mike negotiate this potentially 
difficult communicative exchange belies the complexity of the rational 
expectations, mental states and cognitive processes which make the 
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exchange possible. It is to these phenomena that we must turn for an 
explanation of the rational, intentional, holistic character of utterance 
interpretation. On standard pragmatic accounts, these phenomena are 
integral not just to the recovery of the implicature of an utterance, but 
also to the pragmatic enrichment of the logical form of an utterance. In 
the discussion to follow, we will see how the rational, intentional, ho-
listic character of utterance interpretation seamlessly cuts across both 
aspects of the pragmatic understanding of utterances.
For communication to be possible, Paul and Mike must have 
certain rational expectations of each other in the above exchange. They 
must have an expectation that each is aiming to contribute only rel-
evant, truthful utterances to the exchange. They must also have an 
expectation that each possesses linguistic knowledge as well as world 
knowledge and knowledge of the structure and function of conver-
sation. These rational expectations can be seen to motivate Paul’s 
linguistic choices in the first utterance in the above exchange. Paul 
must have an expectation that Mike has sufficient linguistic and world 
knowledge in order to identify the intended referent of the pronoun 
«we» in his utterance. If Paul did not entertain such an expectation 
of Mike, his use of «we» as opposed to «Sally and I» would be an ir-
rational linguistic choice in this context. Paul must also operate with a 
number of other rational expectations. He must expect Mike to have 
as part of his background knowledge that Paul and Sally have previ-
ously stayed with Mike and Rose in Milan. Otherwise, Paul’s use of 
the iterative expression «again», which presupposes that he and Sally 
stayed with Mike and Rose before, would be another irrational linguis-
tic choice. Also, Paul’s use of the deictic expression «this summer» as 
opposed to a form like «July 2014» only makes sense to the extent that 
Paul has a further rational expectation of Mike – that Mike will be 
able to establish the intended temporal referent of this expression. It 
emerges that every one of Paul’s linguistic choices in the first utterance 
in the above exchange only makes sense on the assumption that Paul 
entertains certain rational expectations of Mike. These expectations all 
concern Mike’s capacity to use aspects of context to arrive at the full 
propositional form of Paul’s utterance. 
However, Paul’s expectations of Mike in the above exchange do 
not end here. It is Paul’s rational expectation that Mike is acting as a 
cooperative communicator that leads him to search for the relevance 
of Mike’s utterance to his (Paul’s) request. That relevance can only be 
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established because Paul operates with an expectation to the effect 
that Mike is contributing truthful, relevant utterances to the exchange. 
It is this expectation which leads Paul to treat the apparent irrelevance 
of Mike’s utterance as the first step in a process of reasoning which 
issues in the implicature that Mike is not agreeable to Paul and Sally 
staying with him and Rose in Milan in the summer. But even in the 
recovery of this implicature there is no end to the rational expectations 
which Paul may bring to his interpretation of Mike’s utterance. For 
one of Paul’s rational expectations of Mike must surely be that Mike is 
able to establish the particular speech act – a request – to which Mike’s 
utterance is intended to be a response. A further rational expectation 
on Paul’s part will be that Mike will want to maintain their pre-existing 
social relationship by declining Paul’s request indirectly by means of 
an implicature rather than by means of a direct response such as «No». 
But even here Paul’s rational expectations of Mike do not come to an 
end. Paul will have additional rational expectations to the effect that 
Mike will view him (Paul) as someone who can competently recov-
er the implicature of an utterance whilst simultaneously recognizing 
Mike’s motivation for the use of implicature in this particular context. 
It can be seen that Paul’s rational expectations of Mike not only mo-
tivate the linguistic choices that Paul uses to frame his message, but 
they are also integral to Paul’s interpretation of Mike’s message in the 
above exchange.
For his part, Mike also has a series of rational expectations of 
Paul in this exchange. Mike’s expectations motivate the linguistic 
choices that he uses to frame his message to Paul. For example, Mike 
can use the pronoun «us» because he has the rational expectation that 
Paul will be able to supply its intended referent, namely, Mike and 
Rose. Similarly, Mike can use the deictic expression «this summer» be-
cause he has a rational expectation that Paul will be able to supply the 
intended temporal referent. Mike’s utterance in the above exchange 
also presupposes that Paul knows who Rose is and that Rose has a 
mother (i.e. her mother is not deceased). These presuppositions only 
make sense to the extent that Mike entertains certain rational expecta-
tions about Paul’s world knowledge. Aside from motivating Mike’s lin-
guistic choices, Mike’s rational expectations also explain his use of an 
implicature to decline Paul’s request. Mike can decline Paul’s request 
by way of an implicature because he has a rational expectation that 
Paul will be able to recover his intended implicature. Further rational 
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expectations on Mike’s part could be delineated, but the point remains 
the same. As soon as we begin to unearth the expectations that Paul 
and Mike must use to make sense of the above exchange, we quickly 
find that there is no end to these expectations. Try as we might to place 
a boundary around these expectations, we can uncover other expecta-
tions that fall outside of the boundary. This situation is troublesome for 
the pragmatist who wishes to produce a theory of utterance interpreta-
tion, because the completeness of such a theory continually appears to 
evade his or her grasp. We will return to this point in section 4. In the 
meantime, we examine another feature of utterance interpretation, its 
intentional character.
Any post-Gricean pragmatist will tell you that a communicative 
exchange is an exchange of communicative intentions. Speakers and 
hearers not only recognize the intentions of others when they interpret 
utterances, but these same intentions also motivate their production of 
utterances. However, communicative intentions are only one part of 
the story of utterance interpretation. In fact, the recognition of com-
municative intentions is only possible to the extent that hearers are 
able to attribute a large range of other cognitive and affective mental 
states to the minds of speakers. To see this, let us return to the above 
exchange between Paul and Mike. Clearly, in order for Paul to under-
stand Mike’s utterance in this exchange, Paul must recognize the com-
municative intention that motivated this utterance, namely, that Mike 
is not willing for Paul and Sally to stay with him and Rose in Milan in 
the summer. But Paul can only recognise this intention after he has 
attributed a number of other mental states to Mike. These states in-
clude cognitive mental states like knowledge, belief and ignorance and 
affective mental states such as happiness, disgust and fear. On hear-
ing Mike’s utterance, Paul must be able to attribute certain knowledge 
states to Mike, including knowledge that Rose’s mother is a retired 
physician, Mike and his wife own a villa in Milan, and that Paul and 
Sally have previously stayed with Mike in the villa. Alongside knowl-
edge states, Paul must also attribute belief states to Mike. Among these 
attributed beliefs are the beliefs that Rose’s mother will spend some 
time at the villa in the summer and that two further guests cannot be 
accommodated in consequence. Paul must also attribute certain states 
of ignorance to Mike, including ignorance of changes to the lease on 
the villa which prevent summer-only residence and ignorance of his 
wife’s plans to leave him for another man before the trip takes place.
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The range of mental states that Paul must attribute to Mike does 
not begin and end in knowledge, belief and ignorance. For Paul must 
also simultaneously attribute a number of affective states to Mike. 
When Paul observes Mike rolling his eyes as he explains that Rose’s 
mother will be staying with them, Paul may reasonably attribute sad-
ness or another negative affective state (anger, etc.) to Mike. Other 
non-verbal behaviours of Mike’s may lead Paul to conclude that his re-
quest will be rejected. For example, Mike’s facial expression may lead 
Paul to conclude that Mike is dismayed at the prospect of having him 
and Sally as summer guests in Milan. Before Paul even produces his 
first utterance in this exchange, he is attributing affective mental states 
to Mike. These states will effectively determine for Paul if he should 
go ahead with his request to Mike, or if it is best to delay the making 
of that request until a later time. For example, if Mike’s non-verbal 
behaviours suggest that he is anxious or fearful, Paul may decide that 
his request will not be well received and that it is best to postpone it 
until he sees Mike again later in the week. What this scenario demon-
strates is that the full panoply of cognitive and affective mental states 
must be attributed to speakers during utterance interpretation, and 
not just communicative intentions. The intentional character of utter-
ance interpretation is not limited to the recognition of communicative 
intentions. In fact, once we begin to reveal the mental states that play 
a role in utterance interpretation, we find that there is no end to this 
process. Like rational expectations before them, mental states are not 
a bounded entity. A fortiori, mental states do not submit to the type of 
complete description that is required of a theory of utterance interpre-
tation. In section 4, we will return to this point. But before doing so, 
we must examine the holistic character of utterance interpretation.
As any pragmatist will tell you, background knowledge is integral 
to the interpretation of utterances. This knowledge is variously charac-
terized and includes knowledge of general and specific empirical facts 
(e.g. fish breathe through gills), knowledge of language (e.g. freedom 
and liberty are synonyms), and knowledge of the other participants in 
an exchange and of specific conversational practices (e.g. turn-taking). 
What pragmatists less often tell you is that this knowledge is holistic in 
nature. In fact, if anything, standard pragmatic accounts portray this 
knowledge as having an atomistic character, with «the knowledge» that 
we use to interpret an utterance represented as an isolable sub-part of 
our wider body of knowledge. It is not difficult to demonstrate that 
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this atomistic characterization is a fundamental misrepresentation of 
the knowledge that we use in utterance interpretation. The knowledge 
that Mike uses to interpret Paul’s first utterance in the above exchange 
might reasonably be expected to include knowledge that Milan is an 
Italian city. But then this knowledge presupposes further knowledge 
to the effect that Italy is a country in southern Europe, that Europe is 
one of several continents, and that the continent of Europe includes 
countries that are part of the European Union (e.g. France) and coun-
tries outside of the EU (e.g. Switzerland). Apart from world knowl-
edge, Mike will also use his linguistic knowledge to establish that the 
intended referent of «we» in Paul’s utterance must be more than one 
individual. But then this linguistic knowledge presupposes knowledge 
of the concept of personhood, knowledge that «we» implies speaker 
inclusivity which is absent in the use of the pronoun «we», and knowl-
edge that personal pronouns may be used to refer to inanimate entities 
(e.g. «The Queen Elizabeth 2 graced the seas for many years until she 
was decommissioned»). 
The point that this example demonstrates is a simple enough 
one: there is no boundary on the knowledge that speakers and hearers 
may use to interpret utterances. Once we start to reveal this knowl-
edge, we quickly find that there is no point at which this process can be 
terminated. Pragmatists have encouraged us to think and talk in terms 
of the knowledge that is relevant to utterance interpretation or that is 
salient for hearers during interpretation, as if this knowledge can be set 
apart from our wider body of knowledge. However, no such demar-
cation is possible or even intelligible, as we will always need knowl-
edge that lies beyond any demarcation in order to make sense of the 
knowledge that is deemed relevant to utterance interpretation. There 
are no isolable sub-units within our knowledge as much in utterance 
interpretation as in any other domain. Certain standard ways of talking 
about utterance interpretation in pragmatics have led us to think oth-
erwise. These ways presuppose a metaphysical standpoint from which 
it is assumed that we can survey human thinking and rationality in its 
entirety without use of the concepts that make that thinking intelligible 
to us. It is this same standpoint which makes it seem that a theory of ut-
terance interpretation is possible and intelligible. As it will be argued 
below, the theoretical impulse with its aim of complete description is 
a misguided impulse when the object of description is communicative 
rationality. This impulse makes it seem that we can circumscribe the 
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rational expectations, mental states and background knowledge that 
are central to utterance interpretation. However, all that can ever be 
achieved through such circumscription is a distortion of the actual use 
of these concepts in interpretation. It is to a wider philosophical ex-
amination of this claim that we now turn. 
4. THE IMPULSE TO THEORIzE IN UTTERANCE INTER-
PRETATION
Thus far, it has been argued that utterance interpretation has a ratio-
nal, intentional, holistic character which no theory of interpretation 
can intelligibly represent. This claim is not without philosophical pre-
cedence. Indeed, the views of the American philosopher Hilary Pu-
tnam relate directly to it (see Cummings 2002a, 2002b, 2005a, 2005b, 
for discussion). Putnam’s influence in philosophy has been immense 
in areas as wide-ranging as the philosophy of language and mind, epi-
stemology and the philosophy of science. His views on metaphysical 
realism are particularly pertinent to the present discussion, and will 
be examined in this section. Metaphysical realism is, as described by 
Putnam, «a bundle of intimately associated philosophical ideas about 
truth» (1988, 107). Its assumptions are threefold. First, there is a uni-
que correspondence relation between the propositions of language 
and features of the external world. Second, there is One True Theory 
of this external world or mind-independent reality. And third, there 
is a commitment to bivalence, such that each proposition of language 
must be either true or false. The metaphysical realist aims to explain 
the success of science in terms of the reference of the theories of scien-
ce to subsets of the totality of all objects. His reductionism leads him 
to pursue an explanation of reference in terms of a causal relation. 
However, it is Putnam’s claim that no intelligible explanation of the 
«facts of language» – for example, that we often assert «there is a castle 
in view» just when there is a castle in view and not when an igloo is in 
view – can proceed in the non-intentional manner typical of reductio-
nist analysis. 
To appreciate this, we must consider what is involved in such an 
explanation. An intelligible explanation of reference must appeal to 
a notion of epistemic priority, such that the explanans – in this case, a 
causal relation – exhibits a greater degree of supportive warrant than 
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the explanandum, here the notion of reference. Warrant presupposes 
the concept of evidence, evidence which is essential to the confirma-
tion of the causal relation in this context. Moreover, the evidence in 
support of this causal relation presupposes the satisfaction of certain 
standards of relevance to that relation. Relevance is not an isolated no-
tion, but one which is further dependent on the concept of meaning 
– to understand the relevance of the evidence of the present case is to 
understand the way in which the content of this evidence bears upon 
the content of the causal relation. In short, a pattern of interrelation-
ships can be shown to exist for a range of such epistemic and norma-
tive notions, a pattern which constitutes a complex network of these 
different concepts. However, it is just these normative and epistemic 
notions which are unavailable to the causal theorist. He is pursuing a 
reductionist analysis – an account of the intentional from within the 
non-intentional – an essential feature of which is its rejection of all 
things normative. With this rejection of normativity and of the epis-
temic concepts described above comes the causal theorist’s failure to 
provide an intelligible explanation of reference. We cannot even make 
sense of an explanation which, by its very nature, resists description in 
terms of relevance, epistemic priority, and so on.
In 1994, Putnam delivered the Dewey Lectures (Putnam 1994a). 
Prior to that time, he appeared content to express his rejection of caus-
al theories in terms of what he believed to be their reductionist nature. 
For Putnam, causal theories are founded upon the mistaken assump-
tion that the facts of various scientific disciplines, be they hard or soft 
in nature, have an informative light to shed on what has traditionally 
been described as the problem of intentionality. With the presentation 
of the Dewey Lectures, Putnam attempted to articulate further his dis-
satisfaction with the metaphysical realist’s position. The focus of his 
attention at this time shifted from the scientific reductionism which 
motivates metaphysical realism and the causal theorist’s response to 
the indeterminacy of reference, to the question of why it seems that a 
reductionist approach is the only serious contender when our inquiries 
turn to problems in the philosophy of mind. Of course, eliminativists 
like Stephen Stich and Richard Rorty would deny such a claim – for 
these philosophers, intentional notions like reference and reason can 
simply be eliminated. However, it is Putnam’s claim that what moti-
vates the case of reductionism – what Putnam, following John Mc-
Dowell, has described as an interface conception of mind – similarly 
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motivates the case of eliminativism. Indeed, once one has accepted an 
interface conception of mind, then one must either proceed by reduc-
ing intentionality or explaining intentionality away.
To see this, consider how reference is accounted for within an 
interface conception of mind. In the Dewey Lectures, Putnam (1994a) 
argues: 
Early modern realism’s philosophy of mind was an attempt to save some 
room for our everyday descriptions while fully accepting [the idea that 
our everyday descriptions cannot possibly apply to the things «as they are 
in themselves»]. According to this new philosophy of mind, our «experi-
ence» is entirely a matter taking place within the mind (or within the brain), 
within, that is to say, a realm conceived of as «inside», a realm where there 
are certainly no tables and chairs or cabbages or kings, a realm so disjoint 
from what came to be called the «external» world that (as Berkeley in-
sisted) it makes no sense to speak of any experience as resembling what 
the experience is «of». Nevertheless, according to those philosophers who 
were not willing to follow Berkeley into idealism, «external» things are the 
causes of our «inner» experiences, and, while the person on the street is 
mistaken in thinking that he or she «directly perceives» those things, still 
we «indirectly perceive» them, in the sense of having experiences caused 
by them. Moreover, even color and warmth and the other «secondary 
qualities» (as they came to be called) can be granted a derivative sort of 
reality – they do not exist as «intrinsic properties» of the things «in them-
selves», but they exist as «relational properties», as dispositions to affect 
our minds (or brains) in certain ways (468-469; italics in original).
In the above passage Putnam describes a type of philosophical 
«solution» to the «problem» of explaining the relationship of percep-
tual experiences to the physical world. Although this solution is seven-
teenth century in origin, it effectively exhausts the type of explanation 
that is traded within present-day philosophical accounts of intention-
ality. For while it is generally held that we can explain our perceptual 
interaction with the world through the use of some suitably formu-
lated causal mechanism, a similar mechanism is presumed to operate 
within our talk of thoughts referring to features of reality. Moreover, as 
part of these accounts it is argued that these causal relations (1) bridge 
the gulf brought about by the dualist’s dichotomy of the mental and 
the physical (a gulf over which our conceptual powers cannot extend) 
and (2) secure a type of objectivity, in that both perceptual experience 
and the referential capacity of language are not the products of some 
fanciful creation on our part, but are ultimately «caused» by an exter-
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nal world. Indeed, it is by virtue of these causal relations that we can 
assign content to our thoughts and perceptual experiences – outside of 
these relations, thoughts and experiences are taken to exhibit syntactic 
structure only. Putnam describes the varied nature of this interface of 
perception and conception as follows:
In the tradition, these «interfaces» […] were originally thought of as men-
tal […] It is not, however, essential to an interface conception of either 
perception or conception that the interface be mental – in materialist 
versions, the interface can be a brain process or brain state. In Quine’s 
version of the interface conception of perception, it is nerve endings on 
the surface of my body that play the role of the interface. In the case of 
conception, the interface has recently been conceived of as consisting of 
«marks and noises» (Rorty); although the interface is not literally «inside» 
us on this Rortian conception, it turns out to generate the same prob-
lematic «gap» between thought and the world. (There is also a version 
– Fodor’s – in which the interface is sentences, but not sentences in a pub-
lic language – marks and noises – but in a language «inside» our brains, 
«mentalese». This is a kind of combination of the linguistic conception 
of the interface with the conception of the interface as «inside the head») 
(unpublished lecture notes).
Within an interface conception of mind our cognitive powers 
extend as far as an interface which is variously represented by sense 
data, qualia or, if your interests are Quinean in nature, by the stimula-
tion of the body’s surface neurons. In general, everything enclosed by 
this interface is of one kind, a strictly mental realm, and everything 
beyond the interface is of a quite different kind, physical relations 
devoid of all intentional character. According to one version of this 
picture, that advanced by Jerry Fodor, in order to explain how our 
thoughts can be about anything, one must first assume the existence 
of syntactically characterized structures, mental entities described in 
terms of their syntactic components. To this one must add semantics, 
physical relations which uniquely determine the truth-values of each 
of the previously specified syntactic structures. It is by means of a re-
duction to these physical relations that the causal theorist proposes 
to explain reference. The eliminativist, sceptical of the prospect of a 
successful outcome to this reductionist project, pursues an elimination 
of intentionality itself. Motivating both responses is the notion of an 
interface between an inner mental realm and an outer physical world, 
an interface which is bridged by a complete reduction of the mental to 
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the physical in the case of reductionism and which is explained away 
along with intentionality in the case of eliminativism.
This interface conception of our cognitive functioning has been, 
and continues to be, enormously influential, so much so that, as Putnam 
has argued, it can come to seem like «post-scientific common sense». 
Notwithstanding the appeal of this picture, the interface conception of 
mind is inherently unintelligible. Its unintelligibility stems from a cer-
tain metaphysical standpoint, one which assumes that we can compare 
thought and language with reality in itself. In the present context, this 
standpoint motivates the causal theorist’s attempt to explain reference 
in terms of a causal relation. For the causal theorist, this relation does 
not presuppose rational discourse but is instead coextensive with this 
discourse. The difficulty with the standpoint presupposed by the causal 
theorist’s view and by the interface conception of mind is that it leaves 
us with no means of making sense of the notion of an «explanatorily 
special» causal relation or of a reality in itself. For in both cases there 
is no residual notion of rationality with which to understand these no-
tions. Moreover, it is not a solution to say that we cannot compare 
thought and language with reality in itself. For in employing the notion 
of a reality in itself, this negative thesis falls foul of the same unintelligi-
bility from which it is intended to be an escape. Under the influence of 
the metaphysical spirit, we inevitably go forward by erecting standards 
about what must be the case in order for our thoughts to represent 
(refer to) reality. The typical manifestation of these standards is in the 
form of a philosophical theory, thus explaining Putnam’s concern that 
«what he is offering should not be taken for a philosophical theory in 
the traditional sense» (1994b; xi).
Putnam’s challenge to metaphysical realism – it is unintelligible 
rather than false – is equally devastating to a pragmatic theory of ut-
terance interpretation. Like the interface conception of mind, which 
assumes that there is an inner, mental domain that is separable from an 
external reality in itself, such a theory assumes that we can throw a net 
around the rational, intentional phenomena that play a role in utter-
ance interpretation. Within the net, we find the concepts that are the 
basis of utterance interpretation. Outside the net, we find a perspec-
tive which exists «in itself» apart from human thought and rationality. 
(In the absence of concepts that can make sense of this perspective, 
Putnam calls it a «we-know-not-what»). The theorist of utterance in-
terpretation is in the same position as the metaphysical realist who aims 
LOUISE CUMMINgS
214
to capture reference in terms of a causal relation between thoughts and 
a mind-independent reality. Such a theorist aims to achieve a com-
plete circumscription of the knowledge and mental states that play a 
role in interpretation. This circumscription must leave nothing behind 
– our entire communicative rationality must fall within its boundary. 
However, no matter how diligent we are in describing the rational ex-
pectations, mental states and knowledge that play a role in utterance 
interpretation, we can never attain a complete description of these 
mental phenomena, as a theory of utterance interpretation would have 
it (see Cummings 2012a, 2012b, for discussion). The impulse to theo-
rize about utterance interpretation, like the impulse to theorize about 
reference, only appears intelligible on the assumption that we can oc-
cupy a metaphysical standpoint, a God’s Eye point of view from which 
it seems that we can describe interpretation without using the same 
rational concepts that make interpretation possible. This point war-
rants further examination.
The pragmatist, I am claiming, is bewitched by the same view of 
our mental phenomena as that which has the metaphysical realist in its 
grasp. That view finds us trying to step outside of our conceptual skin 
by assuming a perspective or viewpoint that is devoid of rational con-
cepts. It seems that this perspective offers the pragmatist not just the 
best, but the only, prospect of describing communicative rationality in 
its entirety. From this perspective, the pragmatist believes he can give 
the fullest possible description of the rational expectations, mental 
states and knowledge that play a role in utterance interpretation. This 
perspective is a type of reality in itself which exists apart from human 
concepts. As such, it seems to permit us to survey thought and ra-
tionality with the type of completeness that theorists aspire to without 
presupposing the very concepts that are to be part of the description. 
It appears that we can well and truly throw a net around every item of 
knowledge that is relevant to the interpretation of an utterance. But 
this beguiling view of the mental phenomena that play a role in utter-
ance interpretation is also a highly fraudulent one. The pragmatist has 
left the realm of sense, which is constructed around his concepts, and 
has stepped into an unintelligible abyss. There can be no complete 
description from this perspective because there can be no description 
at all in the absence of rational concepts. Like the metaphysical realist 
before him, the pragmatist makes no sense at the very point at which 
he believes he has the totality of human concepts within his grasp. In 
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the same way that a causal relation cannot come to represent reference 
in the absence of prior rational concepts so, too, a complete theory 
cannot come to represent the mental phenomena that play a role in 
utterance interpretation. Both the causal relation and the complete 
theory are unintelligible constructs and for the same reason. 
The theorist of utterance interpretation sets out with the noblest 
of intentions. His aim is to produce a complete theory of the rational 
processes that make human communication possible in much the same 
way that physicists strive for complete theories of physical forces in the 
natural world or biologists aim for complete theories of enzyme action 
in organisms. Like his scientific peers, the pragmatist sets about an 
exhaustive process of observation and description which is intended 
to capture every aspect of the phenomenon (utterance interpretation) 
that he is charged with explaining. With such theoretical aspirations 
uppermost in his mind, it can seem to the pragmatist that there is only 
one way of achieving the type of complete description of communi-
cative rationality that he so desperately craves. That way is to step 
outside of his (own) rational thought and survey human thinking and 
rationality in its entirety. But this move marks an unintelligible turn 
for the pragmatist. For in his desire to achieve a complete description 
of communicative rationality, the pragmatist has left behind the very 
rational concepts that confer sense on that description. A concept of 
communicative rationality that has been fully circumscribed is truly a 
«we-know-not what». It is not the complete and intelligible theory of 
physical and natural phenomena that the scientist can produce, but an 
aberration of rationality that defies even meaningful description. The 
theoretical impulse that serves scientists so well in their inquiries is 
positively destructive when it is rational thought itself that is the focus 
of this impulse. Unbeknown to the pragmatist, his well-intentioned 
theoretical aspirations lead not to a complete theory of utterance inter-
pretation but an unintelligible simulacrum of such a theory.
To recap, it has been argued that a theory of utterance inter-
pretation suffers the same unintelligibility in the final analysis as the 
metaphysical realist’s causal theory of reference. Putnam eloquently 
exposes the unintelligibility of the metaphysical realist’s position. It is, 
he argues, an attempt to capture an intentional notion such as refer-
ence without presupposing the rational concepts that are needed to 
make sense of this concept. I am claiming that the pragmatist commits 
himself to the very same unintelligibility when he attempts to develop 
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a theory of utterance interpretation. To achieve the completeness of 
such a theory, the pragmatist seeks recourse in a metaphysical stand-
point, a type of God’s Eye point of view from where he assumes he 
can describe human thought and rationality in its entirety, including 
human communicative rationality. Such a description appears to be 
truly exhaustive – no rational concept is omitted or sits outside of 
the description. But what the pragmatist has produced is not a com-
plete description of communicative rationality but an unintelligible 
description. We cannot even recognize a description of human com-
municative rationality which purports to be complete. In the same 
way that Putnam claims the metaphysical realist has become utterly 
removed from the rational discourse which confers meaning on our 
statements about truth, reference and intentionality, the pragmatist, 
I am claiming, has divorced himself from the very rational discourse 
that we need to make sense of our statements about utterance in-
terpretation. The impulse to theorize, which has been and continues 
to be so productive in the physical and natural sciences, has some 
very unfortunate consequences when we turn to questions about the 
nature of human thought and rationality, including communicative 
rationality. 
5. IF NOT A theory OF UTTERANCE INTERPRETA-
TION, THEN wHAT?
It has been argued that a theory of utterance interpretation leads the 
pragmatist into unintelligibility. Like the causal theorist, who attem-
pts to account for the notion of reference without presupposing the 
very rational concepts that make this notion intelligible, the pragma-
tist commits himself to unintelligibility by trying to develop a theory 
of communicative rationality. So what is the pragmatist to make of 
this situation? If a theory of utterance interpretation is unintelligible, 
is there anything that the pragmatist can meaningfully say about inter-
pretation? The answer to this question is that meaningful discourse 
about utterance interpretation is possible, even if such discourse can-
not take the form of a theory. For a route through this unintelligibility, 
Putnam’s views – and particularly his understanding of the writing of 
Wittgenstein – are once again revealing. As James Conant remarks in 
the introduction to Putnam’s Words and Life:
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The readings of (both early and later) Wittgenstein which Putnam (now) 
wishes to take issue with are all readings which understand Wittgenstein 
to be calling upon us to acknowledge the existence of certain limits (the 
limits imposed on thought by the logical structure of language, or the lim-
its imposed on knowledge by the contingent nature of our forms of life). 
Wittgenstein (according to the readings Putnam opposes) shows us how 
to acquiesce in – rather than chafe against – these limits. Most of the read-
ings of Wittgenstein which are presently in circulation (however much 
they may otherwise differ from one another) are of this variety, counselling 
us to resign ourselves to our inability to transcend the conditions of hu-
man knowledge. The readings of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and Philosophi-
cal Investigations that Putnam himself (now) urges are ones which take 
Wittgenstein to be concerned to show that the limit against which, in our 
philosophizing, we (imagine ourselves to) chafe is an illusory limit. On this 
reading of Wittgenstein... «we cannot know the world as it is “in itself”... 
not because the “in itself” is an unreachable limit, but because the “in 
itself” doesn’t make sense» (1994b, xl; italics in original).
Conant’s use of the expression «our philosophizing» is signifi-
cant in this context. Its significance stems from what Cora Diamond, 
Putnam and Wittgenstein all see as what becomes of our concepts un-
der the pressure of doing philosophy. In an attempt to understand the 
effects of this pressure, Putnam has drawn upon the insights of Amer-
ican pragmatism, the principal appeal of which, in his opinion, has 
been an emphasis on the primacy of practice. The ways of talking and 
thinking which are fundamental to our practices give rise to pictures, 
pictures which can all too easily become the source of much metaphys-
ics in philosophy. In demonstration of this, consider the case of our 
«using a picture» and the case of our «being in the grip of a picture». 
The former is the concern of Diamond’s realistic spirit, a spirit which 
aims to recover the role that various concepts play in our lives. The 
latter is the work of the metaphysical spirit, the characteristic activity 
of which is a laying down of metaphysical requirements about what 
must be the case in order for something – reference, determinacy of 
sense, knowledge of other minds, and so on – to be possible. The sat-
isfaction of these requirements results in an inevitable distortion of the 
very concepts that we are seeking to understand. This same distortion 
continues to haunt the endeavours of those who wish to escape from 
metaphysical realism. Such is Putnam’s criticism of Rorty’s attempt to 
abandon notions like representation.
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It is part of Putnam’s own attempt at recovery – what he has 
described as common-sense realism and a «deliberate» or «second 
naïveté» about conception – that he would have us take seriously the 
teachings of Wittgenstein. Sections 25 and 95 of Philosophical Investi-
gations typify the picture that Putnam has in mind:
Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much a part of our 
natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing (25)
when we say, and mean, that such-and-such is the case, we – and our mean-
ing – do not stop anywhere short of the fact; but we mean this-is-so (95)
The metaphysical spirit urges us to proceed in our philosophis-
ing by considering concepts apart from their applications in the differ-
ent domains of our lives. When we do eventually set about examining 
their applications, we can only see these concepts through a lens of 
metaphysically imposed standards. As James Conant has remarked, 
«This is one way into metaphysics» (Putnam 1994b, liii). To overcome 
the domination that the metaphysical spirit has over us and, in so do-
ing, find a way back out of metaphysics, we must first reverse the order 
of this examination, a task which is the concern of the realistic spirit. 
The realistic spirit encourages us to begin by looking and seeing just 
how concepts are applied within our various practices. This requires 
that we engage in a process of description, the aim of which is an ac-
curate characterisation of the consequences that a particular picture, 
and the concepts inherent in it, has for its user. In his Lectures and 
Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology & Religious Belief, Wittgen-
stein describes the considerations that are subsumed within this type 
of description:
«God’s eye sees everything» – I want to say of this that it uses a picture.
I don’t want to belittle him [the person who says it.]…
We associate a particular use with a picture...
What conclusions are you going to draw?... Are eyebrows going to be 
talked of, in connection with the Eye of God?...
If I say he used a picture, I don’t want to say anything he himself wouldn’t 
say. I want to say that he draws these conclusions.
Isn’t it as important as anything else, what picture he does use?...
The whole weight may be in the picture... When I say he’s using a picture 
I’m merely making a grammatical remark: [What I say] can only be veri-
fied by the consequences he does or does not draw...
All I wished to characterize was the conventions he wished to draw. If I 
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wished to say anything more I was merely being philosophically arrogant 
(1966, 71-72; italics in original).
The most outstanding feature of this descriptive process is the re-
strictions placed on the extent of the description. Wittgenstein doesn’t 
want to say anything he (the user of the picture) himself wouldn’t say; 
indeed, to say more is ‘being philosophically arrogant’. In fact, to say 
more is to proceed to philosophise in the manner urged by the meta-
physical spirit, a manner in which we describe the application of a pic-
ture through an understanding of that same picture in isolation from 
its applications. Under the influence of the metaphysical spirit, we in-
evitably go forward by erecting standards about what must be the case 
in order for our thoughts to represent (refer to) reality. The typical em-
bodiment of these standards is in the form of a philosophical theory. 
It is this very same theoretical impulse which, I contend, we must now 
also eschew in relation to utterance interpretation. 
Applied to utterance interpretation, the type of descriptive proc-
ess urged by Putnam has already been demonstrated. In section 3, we 
progressively revealed the rich array of rational expectations, mental 
states and knowledge that was used by Paul and Mike to make sense of 
each other’s utterances in their brief verbal exchange. There was noth-
ing forced about the description that was offered of this exchange. 
Rather, the description simply emerged as we carefully laid bare the 
significance of each utterance in this exchange for Paul and Mike. But 
from this description powerful observations were made about utter-
ance interpretation and insights achieved. The essential interconnect-
edness of concepts was a particularly noteworthy observation. In this 
way, it was not possible to assign referents to terms such as «us» and 
«we» without acknowledging a range of mental states, including that 
the speaker must believe that the hearer has the background knowl-
edge needed to make these reference assignments. Similarly, it made 
no sense to talk about the presupposition that was triggered by the 
iterative expression «again» in Paul’s first utterance in this exchange – 
Paul and Sally had stayed with Mike and Rose before – in the absence 
of Paul’s beliefs about Mike’s mental states, and particularly Mike’s 
knowledge of Paul’s earlier stay in Milan. These conceptual intercon-
nections are distorted by pragmatists who pursue theories of utterance 
interpretation. For it is in the very nature of the theoretical impulse to 
treat presupposition, reference assignment and a range of other prag-
matic phenomena as isolable concepts which misrepresent the actual 
LOUISE CUMMINgS
220
use of these concepts by speakers and hearers. It is from the descrip-
tion of these conceptual interconnections that a proper understand-
ing of utterance interpretation will emerge and where, I contend, the 
future focus of pragmatics must lie. 
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